



I have been asked to comment on the papers of Professors Okudaira, t
Higuchi, 2 Urabe, 3 and Maki. 4 I will focus on one salient point developed by
Professor Okudaira, namely judicial review, which is the linchpin of the rule of
law. The 1947 Constitution is the first justiciable constitution in Japanese
history; it creates justiciable rights, which in turn make citizens out of the
emperor's former subjects. No matter how formal these changes may be, they
are of prime importance to the growth of popular governance in Japan.
Professor Okudaira states that judicial review is an Americanism, now
found in Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution. This article might be
thought of as a codification of Marbury v. Madison.5 However, its timid
implementation by the Japanese Supreme Court has disappointed Professor
Okudaira and many other Japanese, as well as many Americans. It seems that
the Supreme Court of Japan does not heed Chief Justice John Marshall's
famous words in McCulloch v. Maryland: "[W]e must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding." 6
I agree with this view and suggest that there are many reasons for the
Court's restraint. Two reasons stand out: (1) within the legal establishment,
there persists a prewar Germanic, public-law orientation, inadequate for
effective American-style judicial review; and (2) there is a predominance in
Japanese governance of a powerful, elitist bureaucracy, which is still able to
operate largely outside the field of law. Professor Okudaira estimates that 85
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law and Director, Asian Law Program, School of Law, University of
Washington. Duke University School of Law and Professor Percy Luney deserve a word of thanks for
making possible this symposium on the first forty years of the postwar Constitution ofJapan. It has
been twenty years since a similar English-language symposium was held in Seattle to celebrate the
Constitution's twentieth anniversary in 1968. Five of the original eleven authors in 1968 were
present for this symposium: Professors Isao Sato, John Maki, B.J. George, Lawrence Beer, and
myself. See THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967 (D. Henderson, ed.
1969).
1. Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and its Various Influences: Japanese, American, and
European, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1990, at 17.
2. Higuchi, The Constitution and the Emperor System: Is Revisionism Alive?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1990, at 51.
3. Urabe, Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View Between the United States and Japan, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1990, at 61.
4. Maki, The Constitution ofJapan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights, LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1990, at 73.
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
percent of Japanese governance remains, in practice, beyond the law. 7
Ordinary citizens, under Japanese law, simply cannot bring the bureaucracy
into court to measure administrative action by statutory or constitutional
standards. Even if they could sue, the remedies are quite inadequate. The
problem is purely that the Japanese legal establishment is an entrenched
carry-over from the prewar days when the imperial bureaucracy was
responsible only to the emperor. In essence, this situation meant that the
bureaucracy was responsible only to itself. There is nothing wrong with such
an attitude in the world of Confucius. Since World War II, however, the
entire elitist corporate management and the network of business associations,
combines, and cartels have also been a part of the "bureaucracy" in the
broader sense and similarly operate in large part beyond the law in concert
with public officials. This structure, as a whole, forms Japan's unwritten
constitution, which is run excessively by the convergence of money and power
at the top, and is perpetuated by the skewed electoral system.
Power is thus primarily outside the legal system; it is exercised
extraconstitutionally in many important spheres. In other words, Japan is in
large part socially, rather than legally, governed. As several scholars at the
symposium noted, this problem is essentially political. The position of all
courts, including the Supreme Court, is weak in the presence of a politically
powerful bureaucracy that continues to operate by way of so-called
"administrative guidance" with little basis in law. This compounds the courts'
longstanding tradition ofjudicial restraint, which stems from their historically
close control by the prewar Ministry ofJustice. Today, judicial conservativism
also is perpetuated by the appointive powers of the Liberal Democratic Party
("LDP"). Therefore, as timid as the Supreme Court may be in developing its
judicial review under Article 81, I think the real problems are the power
structure, the prior social practices, and the thought patterns persisting in
Japanese politics.
Because of these power relationships and the political and social structure
that operates outside of the legal system, it seems doubtful that the courts will
develop an activist stance, or that a bold expansion ofjudicial remedies by an
activist court could be successful. In the final analysis, the voters could tip the
balance towards justiciable rights (jinken) and a rule of law. However, they
would have to get the legislature to strengthen the statutes authorizing
administrative suits by introducing a private bill rather than the usual cabinet
bills drafted in the bureaucracy. With the support of such a popular revolt,
the courts could afford a bolder stance and achieve a more balanced
relationship with the dominant bureaucracy and plutocracy. We should
remember, however, that judicial activism in American history has been at
best controversial and at worst undemocratic. In addition, marshaling and
focusing popular support on an issue such as judicial review would indeed be
politically difficult in Japan. Ironically, the reason for this difficulty may be
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that the extralegal social governance of Japan seems to provide enough
equality and civil liberties to satisfy most Japanese. Moreover, in terms of
prosperity, the results are good and apparently acceptable to the people.
II
Professor Higuchi raises the question of whether Emperor Hirohito's
death increases the risk of a stronger imperial role in government by way of
constitutional revisionism, either through outright amendments or by
concealed revision in practice.8 His paper reminds me of the autumn of 1945
and my first arrival in Tokyo. I was a young lieutenant in the United States
Army, serving as a Japanese language officer in a minor censorship role. I was
assigned to the Pictorial, Press, and Broadcast Section of the Civil Censorship
Detachment of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers ("SCAP"). However,
I ended up doing very little censoring because the Japanese media were soon
able and quite willing to censor themselves, and I could not sense any
disposition on the part of the press or radio under my supervision to violate
our simple code against militarism and against maligning the Occupation or
allied powers. But my position provided a good spot from which to observe
the constitutional changes unfold, in much the same way as the Japanese
public saw them. To us, as newspaper readers, much of the inner workings of
the constitutional drafting process remained obscure until they were later
revealed.9
The debate about Emperor Hirohito was most exciting. Some felt that
Hirohito might be tried as a war criminal, and that the Imperial House might
be abolished. The issue, however, was soon resolved-some have said with
embarrassing haste-by the present constitutional formula found in Chapter
I: The emperor reigns, but does not rule.10 This Chapter seemed to
telescope for Japan several centuries of bloody European monarchism into
eight simple articles of the new Constitution.
I had some minimal background on the subject of imperial authority
because at Whitman College in 1943 I had written my senior thesis on
Japanese political philosophy. In retrospect, my paper was quite an
amateurish work based on scarce material such as Shin'ichi Fujii and the
like." The experience left me in 1945 feeling that a fair analysis of the
imperial system should separate the man from the role. Simply because
Hirohito played the role of emperor did not make him personally a war
criminal because the role was that of a religious and ritualistic symbol
formally, and he was, arguably, a puppet. Playing this role, however, did not
8. See Higuchi, supra note 2.
9. For a recent authoritative example, see Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial
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preclude the possibility of his personal involvement in the war. That issue
was never tried because the Emperor's fate was resolved out of open court. In
court, the extent of his involvement in war decisions made about such matters
as Manchuria, China, and Pearl Harbor might have been scrutinized and
decided one way or the other on the evidence brought forward. Such a
determination did not occur, though the Emperor's fate was quite
controversial for a few months after surrender.
Of course, more than correct analysis about the war was involved in
determining the emperor's role in the new constitutional scheme. For
instance, there was the matter of SCAP's immediate convenience. Anti-
imperial protagonists made allegations, difficult to confirm in any detail, that
SCAP made a tradeoff, allowing the emperor to stay, in exchange for a
conservative government's cooperation on other democratic changes essential
to the Potsdam goals. Also, General MacArthur supported the emperor.
Overall, it seemed to me then that the decision, however made, was an
acceptable solution, because it formally removed the real problem for a
modern Japan. That problem had been that power-wielders had used the
emperor to mystify and obscure their irresponsible acts of government. My
impression was that most politically aware Japanese people at that time had
sensed this clearly enough, too. Surely, the intervening forty years has
removed the emperor from the center stage. The recent succession of
Emperor Akihito is an exceptional event.
I suppose, however, that it is natural for some hard-core conservatives of
religious fervor to long still for a mystifying faqade, rather than the noisy
openness of democratic policy debate. It is difficult to wean those holding
such views of their powers and privileges. Professor Higuchi suggests that the
weaning process has not yet been fully accomplished, and I agree. But I do
not think the group that wants even a semblance of the prewar emperor is
very large or has much credibility with the Japanese public today.
Still, such forces linger on, even existing in high places. As a young
political science teacher at Berkeley, I was in Japan in the early 1950s
gathering material for a doctoral thesis. A colleague invited me to a meeting
on constitutional revision with a spokesman of the LDP, who was unknown to
me at that time. There were only about a dozen of us at the meeting. The
spokesman suggested reforms that would reduce local autonomy and revive
the old family, the old peerage, and the old imperial powers for the
bureaucrats. From my perspective, his vision was obviously backward. It left
most of us quite surprised, even shocked. The spokesman was Kishi
Nobusuke. Within a short time thereafter, he became prime minister.' 2
Thus, Professor Higuchi rightly argues that some vigilance is still needed.
He reminds us that Yasuhiro Nakasone, another strong prime minister of
forthrightly revisionist views, has only recently left office. He points to the
serious mistreatment of the mayor of Nagasaki because of his views on
12. Kishi Nobusuke was prime minister from 1957 to 1960.
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Emperor Hirohito's wartime role.13 Surely, the mayor's views deserve
protection under Article 21 of the Constitution, whether one agrees with
them or not. Finally, Professor Higuchi reminds us of the latent theology in
the 1989-90 succession process. Clearly, some of the old school are still
around.
As Professors Higuchi and Okudaira note, these extremist views, while
they may still exist, have waned because they do not have the support of most
of the Japanese people. This observation relates to my final comment. Much
of the force of the conservative revisionist position on these matters is
buttressed by their argument that the 1947 Constitution is an imposed
constitution, not a Japanese constitution. The argument is based on the role
SCAP played in the Constitution's drafting and adoption. Their argument is
reinforced by pointing to the language of the Constitution itself, which, it is
argued, even sounds foreign in phrase and diction. Both of these arguments
are specious because they are half-truths. The language argument is partly
true, but only because the old Japanese terminology of confucianistic, elitist
authoritarianism and Shinto theology is clearly inappropriate to express
democratic values such as human rights and popular sovereignty. Language
changes were necessary to achieve this purpose. In fact, in order to provide
that ministers of state be civilians,1 4 not military men, a new word for civilian
had to be invented (bunmin).15 The real question should be the aptness of
the neologisms, and these are subtle concerns.
I do not find very cogent, however, invoking SCAP's role in dealing with
the defeated leaders to support the argument about the "imposed
constitution." Of course, as Professor Higuchi clearly says, the Constitution
was in fact presented to Japan's defeated leaders with minimal conditions of
popular governance attached. Understandably those defeated leaders were,
on some of these issues, unable to transcend their authoritarian past. If we
must dwell on the issue, we could say that such conditions were imposed on
Shidehara and his colleagues in the fall of 1945 and early 1946. But the
criterion of legitimacy is otherwise: Was the Constitution imposed on the
Japanese people? This criterion was clearly met by the overwhelming
embrace of the Japanese people in the April elections of 1946. I censored
(without making any substantial deletions or changes) all of the candidates'
broadcasts for the island of Hokkaido, and the winners there were those
supporting change. True, as in any campaign, there was opposition, but the
positive expressions for change were overwhelming. This popular support
satisfies the criterion for legitimacy. The Constitution was not imposed on
the people then, and the majority have supported it ever since, because they
want to live in a world of peace and in a democracy understandable to the
international community.
13. See Higuchi, supra note 2, at 59.
14. 1947 CONST. art. 66(2).
15. See Kades, supra note 9, at 240.
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Unfortunately, the debate over whether the Constitution was "imposed"
has cast constitutional reform into an emotional mold, which makes any
reform difficult to discuss. Like any other human work, the Constitution is not
perfect. Among the interesting results of the work of the Commission on the
Constitution were the many thoughtful proposals for amendments proffered
by individuals and made available in the Commission's report (without its
endorsement). 16 But rational discussion of real improvements is hardly
possible in a climate produced by reactionaries, still a part of public life,
whose dreams of Japan are all in the past.
III
Professor Urabe's paper notes that Japanese public law was never
justiciable until the new Constitution imported the concept of the rule of law
in 1947.17 Thus, the rule of law is not only an alien concept, but a fledgling
one of only forty years. Furthermore, the concept is more verbal than real.
Therefore, the problem is the implementation of a new, imported, verbal
formula that permeates the entire legal system only formally and only touches
society on the surface. This task is enormous and, while much has been
accomplished in the last forty years, progress has still been slow. Of course,
the rule of law also has its problems here in the United States. Since the New
Deal, the welfare state has created a bureaucracy with positive tasks that strain
the principles of separation of power and are as difficult to conform to the
rule of law as they are to control by the electoral process. Criticisms made by
the American Legal Realists and, more recently, the Critical Legal Studies
movement, even if not entirely persuasive, still raise challenging questions
about the rule of law in this country and the limitations of the institution of
law generally.
I can only emphasize a point or two. First, the rule of law is a political
theory, in that it serves as a way of implementing popular sovereignty. Its
essence is popular rights, which are exercised in their assertion by the people.
These rights function, if at all, only from the bottom up. No one can give
them to another. Second, the importance of rights assertion is particularly
clear when the citizen is pitted against a strong elitist bureaucracy like Japan's.
Professor Urabe correctly identifies several factors that hinder a thorough
implementation of the rule of law in Japan. The "one-and-a-half party"
system is part of the problem, but that system will not change until the people
vote the LDP out of its dominance. Why they should do so is not obvious,
given the choices. Particularly when satisfied with the party's performance,
reinforcing a two-party system is not within the electorate's appropriate
ambit. The electoral system is also a factor: The serious malapportionment is
clearly unconstitutional, and the influence of money in politics is excessive.
By asserting their rights, however, the people could convert the bureaucrats
16. COMM'N ON THE CONSTITUTION, REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION 1958-
1964, at 372 (J. Maki trans. 1980).
17. See Urabe, supra note 3, at 63-64.
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into public servants, instead of the elitist cadre they are today. By all
accounts, the bureaucracy now operates largely by way of discretion, or
"guidance," quite outside the legal system, which in standard democratic
theory is the people's instruction to their "servants" by statute. Professor
Urabe correctly specifies these problems. However, another way to interpret
the present failure of the rule of law to function with the depth expected in a
democratic society is that the Japanese people accept, maybe even prefer, a
rule of bureaucrats.
IV
Professor Maki identifies the key principles of Japanese postwar
constitutionalism-pacifism, popular sovereignty, and fundamental human
rights. 18 He then applauds the Japanese achievements of stability, prosperity,
and crisis avoidance under the new legal order, in spite of the system's
imperfections. He identifies these weaknesses as (1) the Self-Defense Forces,
which are controversial under Article 9; (2) the bureaucracy; (3) the
permanent dominance of the LDP which in turn depends on a serious
malapportionment that is incurable by judicial review; and (4) the overriding
influence of money and business in politics. Despite these deplorable
inadequacies in the system, Professor Maki's overall assessment is quite
upbeat, and I do not quarrel much with his appraisal. I do think, however,
that two major features of Japanese constitutionalism do not get the focus
they should. First, as I noted earlier, the constitution occupies an essentially
superficial position in a social system where so much is outside the realm of
justiciability and cannot be rectified by resort to the legal system, at least not
in any realistic sense. The bureaucracy is responsible for most government
action (policy, as well as execution), and is almost, but not quite, wholly
beyond realistic constitutional challenge. Most of what the Diet does is born
in the ministries; it passes into legislation with precious little change and
clearly displays its bureaucratic sources by allowing massive discretion for
officialdom. Second, the elections are deeply problematic. Real choices are
denied due to a lack of an opposition. Minor parties, atrophied by
inexperience and ideology, are withered away by the LDP's monopoly of
money. Elections are also skewed by rural gerrymandering that undercuts the
growing urban vote. Specifically, I think the decision in Anta v. Kojima '9 was a
mistake because it approved corporate political payments to the LDP, which
perpetuates the lopsided influence of money on elections.
Yet, this scenario, which reduces the Constitution to a very shallow bite
even in the realm of government, is only part of the context I am discussing.
Most of the massive regulation of peoples' lives is social, not governmental. It
occurs in the family, the school, the company, the association, the cartel, and
the community. Professor Okudaira puts it succinctly and correctly: "Japan is
18. See Maki, supra note 4.
19. Arita v. Kojima (The Yawata Steel Political Contribution Case), 24 Minshfi 625 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B.,June 24, 1970).
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politically free, but socially not free." 20 The key point is the separation of the
governmental and social spheres, and the practical inaccessibility of either
sphere to change by law or lawsuits.
The Japanese informal governance in social groups is a form of
decentralization, which has some merits. For example, the authoritarian
strains of residual confucianistic thinking in these social institutions are
mitigated and made to work well by the fact that decisions are left to those
who know each other and care about each other, but the fact remains that the
decisions of these social functionaries cannot be challenged at law or
otherwise. So, it seems that any assessment ofJapan's performance under the
Constitution must start by recognizing how much of Japanese performance is
yet unaffected by the Constitution, or indeed law, lawsuits, and lawyers
generally. This analysis does not itself imply a negative evaluation of the
Japanese methods of governance. It does, however, imply a lesser role for
constitutionalism. Confucius did not agree with Lord Acton that power
always tends to corrupt, or that a rule of man must be replaced by a rule of
law. I suspect that there is a lot of neo-neo-confucianism in Japan's modern
bureaucracy and a widespread public faith in the elitism and &lan of that
bureaucracy-something quite foreign to democratic legal culture. Perhaps
my point could be expressed by analogy to the concept of an "unwritten
constitution." Much ofJapanese society is highly structured, and life is highly
controlled by rules, but these rules are not written orjusticiable. Moreover,
the whole structure is only loosely linked with the written Constitution. With
respect, I think the whole must be viewed in this context in order to see real
Japanese constitutionalism at work, and also to see where it does not work.
20. See Okudaira, supra note 1, at 26.
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